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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes measurement errors in crime data to see how they impact 
econometric estimates, particularly of the key relationship between inequality and 
crime. Criminal victimization surveys of 140,000 respondents in 37 industrial, 
transition and developing countries are used. Comparing the crimes experienced by 
these respondents with those reported to the police, non-random and mean-reverting 
measurement errors are apparent. Some time-varying factors may also affect the 
propensity of victims to report crimes to the police, undermining the use of country-
specific fixed effects as a means of dealing with measurement errors in official crime 
data. These measurement errors substantially attenuate both cross-sectional and panel 
estimates of the effect of inequality on crime. 
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I. Introduction 
Why do some countries have more crime than others?  In a series of recent papers, Fajnzlber, 
Lederman and Loayza (2002, 2002a) and Lederman, Loayza, and Menéndez (2002) [hereafter 
FLL and LLM] suggest that high inequality, low growth and a lack of social capital all cause 
higher rates of violent crime in a panel of 39 countries.1 These particular culprits are not new, 
and echo findings from many studies of crime in the United States.2 But the unusual feature of 
this new research is that it is uses cross-country data on official crime rates. Such an approach 
ignores criminologists’ concerns about the reliability of cross-country analysis (Marenin, 1997). 
Doubts occur because of differences in the propensity to report and record crime in different 
countries: 
“Police figures of recorded crimes cannot be taken at face value as measures of 
crime… [N]ot all crimes are reported or noticed by the police and not all 
reported crime is recorded… [Also] legal definitions of crime vary across 
countries. For these reasons, police figures cannot be used for comparative 
purposes. There is general consensus among criminologists about this.” (Van 
Dijk, 2000: 26) 
These reporting problems show up in the discrepancy between victimization surveys and official 
crime statistics. For example, correlations between official rates for four types of crime and the 
corresponding victimization rates average only 0.22 across 26 countries in Europe, ranging from 
a correlation of zero for burglary to 0.36 for robbery (Gruszczynska and Gruszczynska, 2005). 
Three strategies are used by FLL and LLM to deal with these data problems. First, they 
focus only on homicide and robbery rates, which they expect to be more reliably measured than 
less serious crimes. Second, panel data are used to control for unobserved, country-specific 
effects. If the factors determining the under-reporting of crime are relatively stable over time, 
                                                 
1 The exact number of countries depends on the time period and the type of crime, with fewer observations available 
for robberies than homicides. LLM (2002) only use a cross-section, with some regressions based on only 25 
countries.  
2 See, for example, Blau and Blau (1982), Patterson (1991), and Doyle, Ahmed and Horn (1999). 
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these country fixed effects can minimize any econometric bias resulting from measurement errors 
in official crime rates. Third, they use instrumental variables to take account of the possible 
simultaneous relationship between crime and key explanatory factors, such as the output growth 
rate and the level of inequality and social capital. These instrumental variable methods can also 
help to mitigate the effects of certain types of measurement error.  
Despite these safeguards, incorrect inferences could still be drawn from cross-country 
research on official crime rates, especially if the nature of measurement error differs from its 
assumed behavior. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine measurement errors in 
crime data to see what impact these errors have on econometric estimates, particularly of the 
relationship between inequality and crime. The analysis is based on the International Crime 
Victim Survey (ICVS), covering 37 industrial, transition and developing countries. Victimization 
surveys are designed to measure ordinary people’s experience of crime, rather than the 
statistician’s view of crime as it is reported to and recorded by the police. While victimization 
surveys have been available for some time, most economic studies have chosen not to use them, 
partly because it is believed that such data are available for only a few countries (Bourguignon, 
2000). This concern seems misplaced because the number of countries used here is close to the 
maximum sample size in the cross-country analyses of LLM. Moreover, lying behind these 
victimization estimates for the 37 countries are the survey responses of over 140,000 individuals, 
which are a potentially rich source of information on the nature of reporting errors. 
The only other paper in the economics literature that considers the effect of reporting 
errors on cross-country analyses of the determinants of crime is Soares (2004). However, several 
limitations in that paper are addressed here. First it only uses a cross-section of country-level 
average victimization rates rather than exploring both the individual survey responses and the 
panel aspects of the ICVS data, as is done here. Second, it constructs a “reporting rate” by 
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comparing these victimization rates with official crime rates,3 which is problematic because this 
“reporting rate” also reflects under-recording by police and the justice system, differences in time 
periods for the two data sources, and definitional differences in the types of crimes covered by 
the two data sources.4 There is no need for these extraneous influences to be introduced into an 
analysis of reporting rates because the ICVS directly asks crime victims whether they reported 
the crime to the police, and it is these data that are used here. Moreover, while the framework 
used by Soares (2004) allows measurement errors in crime data to be correlated with explanatory 
variables it does not appear to allow correlation with true values, as could occur with mean-
reverting error. Specifically, Soares regresses average reporting rates for each country on GNP 
per capita, yielding an elasticity of 0.6-1.0 depending on the type of crime.5 Predictions from this 
regression provide a (cross-sectional) estimate of the reporting error, which is then used to create 
an adjusted series of official crime rates for a panel of countries. 
Despite the limitations in Soares (2004), similar conclusions are reached to those reported 
below, with measurement errors shown to greatly reduce the estimated effect of inequality on 
crime. Thus it is quite possible that the conclusions of FLL and LLM that inequality causes 
violent crime would be even stronger if appropriate treatments were used for the measurement 
error in official crime data. This finding is important because a number of criticisms of FLL and 
LLM claim that they have overstated the effect of inequality on crime. For example, Neumayer 
(2005) uses a wider sample of 59 countries and finds no effect of inequality on crime until the 
                                                 
3 Specifically, from the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems 
(UNCS). 
4 For example, the UNCS has data on rapes but the ICVS reports on “sexual incidents” which are defined more 
broadly as follows: “People sometimes grab, touch or assault others for sexual reasons in a really offensive way. This 
can happen either at home or elsewhere, for instance in a pub, the street, at school, on public transport, in cinemas, 
on the beach or at one's workplace.” This victimization is likely to be different than that for crimes officially 
recorded as rape, even in the absence of measurement error. 
5 Soares (2004a) elaborates on this result, finding that reporting rates rise with longer periods of democratic stability 
and with reductions in perceived corruption. Because these factors vary strongly with GNP per capita, Soares 
(2004a) argues that it is not income per se that changes reporting rates but rather institutional development. 
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sample is artificially restricted to the same countries as used by FLL (2002, 2002a), when a 
significantly positive effect of inequality appears.6 Neumayer (2003) claims that the estimation 
methods of FLL (2002, 2002a) are unsuitable for their small samples and shows that inequality 
appears as a statistically significant cause of homicide only when country fixed effects are 
excluded from the panel data model he applies to 90 countries. However, neither of these critical 
studies addresses the measurement error problems in official crime data so the conclusions may 
not hold. 
This focus on measurement errors is also required for evaluating the broader research 
strategy of extending econometric studies of crime to developing countries. These are the 
countries where crime is most costly, despite the skew in the literature towards the U.S.7 For 
example, Bourguignon (2000) estimates that the social cost of crime in Latin America is 7.5 
percent of GDP, which is almost twice the level in the U.S. A better understanding of the 
determinants of crime in developing countries may also help to evaluate the claim that crime is 
one pathway for the link between inequality and low growth (Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002). 
But these research gains may not be realized if official crime data from developing countries 
prove to be so error-ridden that they produce misleading inferences. Hence the need for the 
current paper. 
In Section II, a framework for studying measurement error in reported (official) crime 
rates is explained. Section III describes the victimization surveys and basic features of the data. 
Section IV provides simple empirical tests of the measurement error framework. Section V 
                                                 
6 This assessment of sample selection biases is possible because Neumayer uses Interpol data which are available for 
a wider group of countries than the United Nations Crime Surveys data used by FFL (2002, 2002a). 
7 Demombynes and Özler (2005) are one exception. They show that inequality within police precincts in South 
Africa has a positive and significant correlation with property crimes but no association with violent crimes. 
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contains cross-sectional and panel estimates of regression models relating reported and 
experienced crime to income inequality. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. A Framework for Dealing with Measurement Error in Crime Data 
Consider a cross-country relationship linking crime, y to a set of economic and social variables, x: 
 j j jy xβ ε′= +                       (1) 
To focus only on measurement error, assume that there is no simultaneity between crime and the 
variables in x, so that cov(x,ε)=0 and also assume that there is no measurement error in x. Instead 
of observing the true level of crime, economists only have access to an error-ridden measure. 
Suppose that data on crime rates is subject to reporting error of the form:  
*
j jy y v= + j                                                                                    (2) 
where *jy is the official (or reported) crime rate,  is the true (or experienced) crime rate in the jjy
th 
country, and jv  is a  measurement error in official crime rates. The impact of this error on the 
empirical estimates of each xj variable’s impact on crime,  depends on the particular nature of 
the measurement error. The standard textbook assumptions (case 1) are that the measurement 
error has mean zero and is uncorrelated with anything else, such that 
βˆ
( ) 0jE v =  and 
. In this case a regression model of crime based on the 
error-ridden crime measure will produce unbiased coefficient estimates but the greater error 
variance may affect the precision of those estimates. However, these assumptions usually reflect 
convenience rather than conviction and there is accumulating empirical evidence that 
measurement errors do not follow these assumed patterns (Bound et al. 2001).  
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0j j j j j jCov y v Cov X v Cov vε= = =
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One obvious way in which the standard textbook case is unlikely to apply is that official 
crime data are usually considered to be understated rather than overstated. This may reflect both 
political and policing concerns, as well as the fact that it is usually illegal to make false crime 
reports in contrast to the lack of penalty for not reporting (minor) crimes. Therefore, a more 
realistic assumption may be that the errors have a non-zero (negative) mean, but are still 
uncorrelated with everything else (case 2). In this case, ( ) 0jE v <  and 
. Hence, measurement errors are picked up in the 
intercept term, leaving the coefficients on all slope variables unbiased. In the case of panel data, 
these assumptions allow fixed effects models like those used by FLL, where separate country 
intercepts capture the effect of measurement errors which vary across countries but not over time.  
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0j j j j j jCov y v Cov X v Cov vε= = =
Although uncorrelated measurement errors are convenient to deal with, evidence from 
validation studies in other fields of economics (e.g. labor) suggests that measurement errors are 
often negatively related to true values, causing mean reversion (Bound et al. 2001). In the case of 
errors correlated with true values (case 3), the use of the error-ridden dependent variable is likely 
to cause a proportionate bias in each regression coefficient. This can be seen from a generalized 
version of the measurement error model in equation (2): 
*
j j jy yθ λ= + +u ,                                                      (3) 
where 1 1 ( , ) ( )j j jCov v y Var yλ γ= + = +  and ju is a pure random error. This measurement error 
model is flexible in terms of mean  bias ( *( ) ( ) ( )j j jE y E y Eθ λ >= + < y ) and bias in the estimated 
variance: * 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).j j jVar y Var y Var u Var yλ >= + j<  Classical measurement error is a special case 
of equation (3) where 1λ =  and 0θ = . Thus, with correlated errors (as long as measured crime 
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rates are still positively correlated with true crime rates), the measurement error follows a mean-
reverting pattern ( 0 1λ< < ).This mean reversion in crime rates will tend to make estimated 
regression coefficients too small in magnitude, which is contrary to the textbook case where 
errors in the dependent variable cause no bias in slope coefficients. Thus it could be that the 
effect of inequality on crime is understated in a cross-section, as in the following equation: 
 *j j jy x uβ jλ θ λ′= + + + ε
1
                            (4) 
In other words, the estimated effect of inequality (and other xj variables) on crime is rescaled by a 
mean-reverting pattern ( 0 λ< < ) towards zero.  
In addition to these cases of measurement errors in a cross-section, the effect in a panel 
depends on whether the errors are time-varying. If they are, fixed effects methods such as 
including country-specific intercepts or differencing the data may not remove measurement error 
bias. Some literature suggests that measurement errors in official crime data are likely to be time-
varying, contrary to the assumption used by FLL to justify panel data methods as a way of 
dealing with measurement error. MacDonald (2000, 2001, 2002) shows that in the British Crime 
Survey (BCS), victims of property crime are significantly less likely to report the incident if they 
are unemployed. Because the unemployment rate varies over time, MacDonald concludes that it 
is likely that reporting rates fall during economic downturns. Consistent with this claim, in 1983 
only 39 percent of the crimes experienced by victims in the BCS were reported to the police, at a 
time when the unemployment rate in the U.K. was 12.4 percent. But in 1991 the reporting rate 
had risen to 49.4 percent, while the unemployment rate had fallen to 8.8 percent.  
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III.  Data 
The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) is the most comprehensive program of 
standardized sample surveys of householders’ experience with crime. Starting in 1989 it has 
gathered up to five rounds of data from up to 60 industrial, transition and developing countries. 
Subsequent rounds of the survey were in 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005. The data for this paper 
come from 37 countries (listed in Appendix A) who were included in at least two rounds from 
1992, 1996 and 2000. In total, these countries and survey rounds provide over 140,000 
observations. 
 
In most of the developing and transition countries, the ICVS draws representative samples 
of 1000 households from the largest metropolitan area, although in some cases from several 
cities. The small rural samples in these countries are not used here because they are not 
representative. The samples in industrial countries covered a wider range of locations. In all 
countries, one adult respondent was randomly chosen per household so weights are needed so 
that individuals in larger households are not underrepresented. In the developing and transition 
countries, face-to-face interviews were carried out, while telephone interviewing was used in the 
industrial countries. The response rate is high, averaging 95 percent for the developing countries 
in the 1996 round, 81 percent for the transition countries and 67 percent, in the industrial 
countries. 
The ICVS covers 12 categories of crime, and for each of these the respondents were asked 
about their victimization in the previous five years and in the previous year. For the most recent 
victimization episode they were asked whether they or anybody else reported the crime to the 
police. Six of the categories such as theft of a motorcycle and theft from a garage are ignored 
here because they are experienced by very few people. The remaining categories cover both 
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violent crimes, such as assault and robbery, as well as more minor crimes such as theft from a 
car. 
A descriptive summary of the ICVS data in Table 1 shows that, overall, victimization 
rates are highest in the developing countries. Amongst the more serious crimes, 7.2 percent of 
respondents in developing countries had been assaulted or threatened with assault at least once in 
the previous year, 6.2 percent were robbed, and 7.0 percent had their homes burgled. Amongst 
those who had use of a car, 4.6 percent had their car stolen and 21 percent had a theft from their 
car. While average victimization rates for most crimes in developing countries are at least twice 
as high as those in the industrial countries, for the transition countries victimization rates are 
closer to, and sometimes less than, those reported in the industrial countries. 
The other data, which are used to explain the patterns of crime, come from several 
sources. The inequality data are from the World Income Inequality Database, constructed by the 
UN’s World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER). This database includes 
5,063 data points, with many (2,593) coming from the Deininger and Squire (1996) inequality 
database used in previous international research on inequality and crime.8 Data on GDP per 
capita relative to the U.S. (at Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates) comes from the Penn 
World Table. We also use data on ethnolinguistic fractionalization, coming from Roeder (2001). 
Higher values of this variable may be associated with less reporting of crime because there is 
evidence that communities with high levels of ethnic and cultural diversity have lower levels of 
interpersonal trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). While a wider set of explanatory variables are 
sometimes included in regression models from previous studies, the specification outlined here is 
                                                 
8 The Gini coefficients used here are averages for the three year period for the corresponding ICVS round. For example, 
Gini coefficients for  1995/1997 are matched to the 1996 ICVS round, where this averaging is designed to reduce the 
impact of measurement error. Following Deininger and Squire (1996) and FLL (2002a), any Gini estimates that were based 
on expenditure data were adjusted upwards by 6.6 percentage points to make them comparable to those for income data. 
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reasonably typical, especially because the main aim is to see how measurement errors in crime 
data affect the estimated coefficients rather than to debate the merits of one specification over 
another.   
 
IV.  Simple Tests of the Measurement Error Framework 
The experience of crime is very different to the picture that comes from what is reported to the 
police. In both the developing and transition countries in the sample, car theft and burglary are 
the only types of crime where a majority of incidents are reported to the police. For all the other 
types of crime, it is more normal for victims not to report incidents. Similarly, in the industrial 
countries a majority of attempted burglaries and assault are not reported to the police.  
The evidence on reported crime contradicts the assumption of FLL (2002) that robbery is 
more reliably measured than less serious crimes (and hence is a good proxy for overall crime). 
According to Table 1 the reporting rate for robbery is the second lowest out of the six categories 
of crime considered. Quite minor crimes, such as attempted burglary and theft from cars are all 
more likely to be reported than are robberies. Only for car theft, whose reporting rate is above 
90 percent, would police statistics be considered a reliable measure of the true incidence of 
crime.9  
Furthermore, the level of under-reporting is variable enough across countries to distort 
conclusions drawn from cross-country comparisons of reported crimes. For example, if the 
percentage of victimized respondents is recalculated, using only the crimes reported to the police, 
the risk of assault appears twice as high in rich countries than in developing countries when if 
                                                 
9 These results mirror those reported by Demombynes and Özler (2005) for South Africa, where robbery has the 
lowest reporting rate at 42 percent and car theft has the highest reporting rate at 95 percent. Even the reporting rate 
for homicides in South Africa is only 84 percent, contradicting the assumption of FLL that homicide would be the 
most reliably measured crime. 
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fact the victimization rates are almost the same. Reporting errors also obscure the fact that the 
robbery rate in developing countries is four times higher than in industrial countries. 
The descriptive statistics also allow a basic diagnosis of the nature of the reporting errors. 
Comparing the mean and standard deviation of the reported crime rates to that of the experienced 
crime rates indicates that the measurement errors do not follow the textbook model (case 1). The 
mean of *jy is much smaller than that of jy  so the measurement error cannot have zero mean. For 
example, robbery, which is considered by FLL (2002) to be a crime that should not have large 
reporting errors, has a mean reported rate ( *jy = 0.0118) only one-third that of the actual robbery 
rate ( jy = 0.0384). 
More importantly, the standard deviation of *jy is smaller than that of jy , which rules out 
case 2, where measurement errors have a non-zero mean but are uncorrelated with anything else. 
Recall that in the equation (3) framework: Because of the addition 
of the variance of the pure random error, u
).var()var()var( 2* jjj uyy += λ
j in the measurement error model,  can only be 
less than if 0
)var( *jy
)var( jy 1λ< < . The coefficient λ from the regression of reported crime rates on 
true crime rates can also be expressed in terms of a regression of reporting errors on true crime 
rates because γλ += 1  and ).(),( jjj yVaryvCov=γ  So the finding that 0 1λ< <  also implies 
that .0<γ  In other words, reporting errors appear to be negatively correlated with true crime 
rates. As long as the errors are not so large that measured crime rates lose any positive correlation 
with true values, the measurement errors will cause a mean-reverting pattern ( 0 1λ< < ) in 
official crime rates.   
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To get more direct evidence on the nature of the measurement error, equation (3) was 
estimated by regressing the crimes reported to the police, *jy  on the crimes actually experienced, 
jy . Individual respondent reports are used, giving between 80,000 and 140,000 observations, 
depending on the type of crime. 10  Two estimation methods are used, a “between effects” 
regression, which mimics a regression on cross-country averages, and a “fixed effects” 
specification which relies on the fact that there are repeated observations for the same country in 
the three waves of ICVS data used here. 
The relationship between experienced and reported robbery rates (Figure 1a), and the 
change over time in those rates (Figure 1b), provides some intuition for interpreting these 
regression estimates of equation (3). Figure 1a shows that in a cross-sectional regression on 
country-level averages, the reported robbery rate rises much more slowly than the actual robbery 
rate, with a slope of 0.23 rather than the 1.0 assumed by random measurement error. If this under-
reporting reflects some fixed tendency of countries (as assumed by FLL) the relationship between 
changes over time in actual and reported robbery rates should lie along the 45 degree line. But 
Figure 1b shows smaller changes in reported robbery rates than in actual robbery rates, with a 
slope of 0.18 rather than the 1.0 assumed by fixed effects methods of dealing with measurement 
error. This time-varying measurement error affects the developing and transition countries only. 
For the industrial countries we cannot reject the hypothesis of the slope equaling 1.0. Thus, fixed 
effect methods may be appropriate for dealing with under-reporting of official crime rates in 
industrial countries but are likely to be less successful in transition and developing countries. 
When all the different types of crime are considered the same results hold (Table 2). The 
hypothesis that λ=1 is strongly rejected in each case. The degree of mean reversion in the cross-
                                                 
10 Questions about crimes involving a car are not asked if the respondent does not own a car, causing the number of 
observations to be reduced to about 80,000 for these types of crimes. 
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section is particularly strong for robbery, assault and theft from cars, all of which have λ<0.3. 
According to equation (4), this degree of mean reversion will cause a substantial attenuation in 
regression coefficients, so it is likely that the estimated effect of inequality on crime is 
understated in a cross-section. Direct evidence on this bias is reported below. 
 Biased regression coefficients are also likely in panel studies because according to the 
fixed effects results in the right-hand columns of Table 2, measurement errors for particular 
crimes vary over time within countries. The change over time in reported crime exhibits mean 
reversion implying that there is a negative correlation between the actual level of crime and the 
measurement error in crime reports. This again leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis, 
H0: 1FEλ = . Robbery and assault exhibit the greatest degree of mean reversion.11  
 
Microeconometric Evidence on the Determinants of Reporting Rates 
The evidence reported above suggests that measurement errors in official crime rates have a non-
zero (negative) mean and are negatively correlated with true crime rates. An alternative but 
closely related model is that measurement errors are correlated with other determinants, which in 
turn are correlated with crime rates. To explore this interpretation, a multivariate model of the 
decision to report crimes to the police is estimated. The aim of the model is to identify the factors 
associated with under-reporting to better understand possible pathways through which time 
varying errors may occur. A similar model has recently been estimated with British Crime 
Survey data by MacDonald (2002), who finds that time-varying factors such as employment 
status affect the decision of victims to report burglary to the police. In the model used here, the 
probability of whether a victim reports the most recent crime is assumed to be a function of their 
                                                 
11 The results in Table 2 for robbery differ from those shown in Figure 1b because the samples are different. The 
figure just uses the most recent two rounds of ICVS data for each country to measure the change in actual and 
reported robbery rates whereas the regression uses the change between each of up to three rounds of data. 
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personal characteristics, the characteristics of the local community in which they live, and a set of 
national level variables. An alternative specification also includes their subjective attitudes about 
the police and crime. 
Several personal characteristics affect the decision of victims to report crimes to the 
police (Table 3). Older victims and victims with more years of schooling are more likely to report 
all of the crimes except car thefts. Respondents who are not employed are less likely to report 
both car theft and burglary. To the extent that employment rates change over the business cycle, 
these micro-level determinants of reporting may introduce a time-varying bias, as also found by 
MacDonald (2002). Fixed effects methods would not be expected to fully ameliorate this bias.  
The nature of a respondent’s dwelling and community affects reporting behavior, with 
reporting generally less likely in big cities, less likely for those living in shanty dwellings and 
more likely for those living in high status areas and in an insured dwelling. Conditional on the 
micro-level determinants, reporting rates are lower in more unequal and poorer countries. 
Reporting is also less likely the higher is the linguistic and ethnic diversity. When variables that 
measure respondents’ attitudes are included, it appears that thefts from a car, attempted burglary 
and assault are all more likely to be reported, if the respondent believes that the police do a good 
job.12 To the extent that perceptions about how well police are doing their job vary with actual 
crime rates, this attitudinal influence could be a pathway for mean-reverting errors. 
 
V.  Effect of Reporting Errors on Estimates of the Inequality-Crime Relationship 
The above analysis of how the crimes experienced by ICVS respondents differ from those 
reported to the police suggests that there are non-random and mean-reverting measurement 
errors. There is also evidence that time-varying factors affect the propensity of victims to report 
                                                 
12 Results with these additional controls are available from the authors. 
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some crimes, further undermining the use of country fixed effects as a means of dealing with 
measurement errors in official crime data. To directly assess how important the bias from these 
reporting errors is, cross-country regressions of crime rates on inequality are estimated in this 
section. 
  Table 4 contains the results of three different comparison exercises, where in each case 
either the experienced crime rate jy  or the reported crime rate  are regressed on the Gini 
coefficient.
*
jy
13 The first comparison is just a simple cross-country regression of crime rates on 
inequality, the second adds two covariates – the country’s income level (relative to the U.S.) and 
the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, and the third comparison adds 36 country fixed 
effects to exploit the panel nature of the data.14 The first two comparisons may help to assess 
how measurement error affects the results of Lederman, Loayza, and Menéndez (2002), which 
are based on cross-sectional regressions on crime data from between 25 and 39 countries. The 
third comparison may help to assess the impact of measurement error on the results of Fajnzlber, 
Lederman and Loayza (2002, 2002a) who use cross-country panel data for between 27 to 
49 countries (with between 85 and 136 observations). 
 Simple cross-country regressions show that higher inequality is associated with more 
crime being experienced, for all six types of crime. All of the coefficients on the inequality 
measures are highly statistically significant. To interpret the size of the coefficients, consider a 
10-point rise in the Gini coefficient (equivalent to moving from, say, the United Kingdom to 
                                                 
13 The experienced crime rate is taken to be the proportion of the population who had been victimized one or more times in 
the year prior to the survey so the effects of multiple victimization is not taken into account. 
14 The data are individual-level so it would be possible to estimate microeconometric models. But simply assigning 
macro-level variables like the Gini to each individual may be incorrect because the resulting multi-level model 
exaggerates the degrees of freedom for macro-level variables and ignores the correlation between errors for 
individuals in the same country (unless clustered standard errors are calculated). A standard treatment for multi-level 
models in this context would be to run the micro-level regression for each country and then use the resulting 
coefficient estimates as dependent variables in a cross-country analysis (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). But with only 
macro-level variables in the model, this is equivalent to collapsing the data to cross-country aggregates, as is done 
here. 
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Russia or from Uganda to South Africa). This rise in inequality would increase the robbery rate 
by almost three percentage points (about two-thirds of the mean value) and the burglary rate by 
almost two percentage points (over one-third of the mean value). 
But the results are rather different when reported crime rates are used as the dependent 
variable. Only three types of reported crime have a statistically significant relationship with the 
Gini coefficient (theft from a car, attempted burglary and robbery). Moreover, the regression 
coefficients are considerably attenuated, being from one-half to one-tenth of the value of the 
corresponding regression coefficients when experienced crime is the dependent variable. The 
results of the hypothesis tests in column (3) show that these differences between the two sets of 
regression coefficients are all highly significant.  
Once covariates measuring relative GDP and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are added 
to the regression model there is a slight weakening in the contrast between the results for 
experienced and reported crime. The null hypothesis of no difference between the two sets of 
coefficients is rejected at less significant levels, especially for burglary (p<0.09). Also, there is no 
longer a statistically significant effect of inequality on either experienced or reported theft from 
cars. However, the attenuation of the regression coefficients when using reported crime rates 
rather than experienced crime is unchanged, with the estimated effect of inequality being from 
one-half to one-tenth the size of the effect on experienced crime.  
Introducing country-specific fixed effects into the regressions does not remove the bias 
due to measurement error. All of the regression coefficients are smaller when reported crime is 
used, ranging from three-quarters of the size to one-tenth of the size of the corresponding 
coefficients for experienced crime. These differences are statistically significant for three 
important types of property crime (car theft, burglary and robbery).  
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It is instructive to compare the size of the bias with and without fixed effects. Without 
fixed effects the coefficients on inequality in the regressions for reported crime averaged, in 
absolute terms, 0.13 points less than the coefficients when experienced crime was used. 
Introducing fixed effects reduces this gap only slightly, to 0.10 points. In other words, country 
fixed effects do not appear to remove the bias in regression coefficients caused by measurement 
error in reported crime data, contrary to the assumptions of FLL. This lack of effect appears to be 
because the nature of the measurement error in reported crime differs from the assumed 
behaviour (uncorrelated errors) that is needed for the efficacy of fixed effects.   
 
VI. Conclusions  
According to the results presented here, cross-country econometric research that relies on official 
crime statistics is likely to be misleading. Biased results are likely even when researchers are as 
diligent as Fajnzlber, Lederman and Loayza (2002, 2002a) in restricting attention to crimes that 
are expected to be reliably measured and in using panel data to control for unobserved, country-
specific effects, such as variations in reporting rates. These treatments are not especially effective 
because even for crimes like robbery and homicide there is considerable under-reporting, and the 
reporting errors are not time-invariant.  
The analyses reported here suggest that mean-reversion is the most plausible model of 
measurement error in official crime data. Mean-reverting measurement errors are not very 
amenable to standard treatments like fixed effects and instrumental variables. Other methods such 
as reversion regression and bias bounds (Black et al, 2000) may have greater efficacy, which is a 
topic for further research.  In the absence of these appropriate treatments, the measurement errors 
in reported crime data are likely to greatly reduce the estimated effect of inequality on crime.  
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Appendix A  
Countries in the Sample 
Industrial countries: Australia,2 Canada, England, Finland,1 France, Netherlands, Northern 
Ireland,1 Scotland,1 Sweden, Switzerland,1 and USA.  
Transition countries: Albania,1 Belarus,1 Bulgaria,1 Crotia,1 Czech Republic,3 Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary,1 Latvia,1 Lithuania,1 Poland, Rumania,1 Russia, Slovakia,3 Slovenia, and Ukraine.1 
Developing countries: Argentina, Botswana,1 Brazil,3 Colombia,1 Costa Rica,3 India,3 Indonesia,3 
Philippines, South Africa, and Uganda. 
Note:  
1 Countries absent from the 1992 round of the ICVS. 
2 Countries absent from the 1996 round of the ICVS. 
3 Countries absent from the 2000 round of the ICVS. 
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Figure 1a: "Between" Country Estimates of Actual and Reported Robbery Rates
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Figure 1b: "Within" Country Estimates of Change in Robbery Rates
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Table 1: Victimization Rates and Reported Crime Rates for Various Crimes 
 Victimization Ratea Reported Crime Rate and Reporting Rateb 
 Industrial Transition Developing All Industrial Rc Transition Rc Developing Rc All Rc 
.0263 .0242 .0469 .0304 .0253 .96 .0222 .91 .0434 .92 .0283 .93 Car theft 
(.1763) (.1720) (.2380) (.1918) (.1731)   (.1636)   (.2301)   (.1848)   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
.1205 .2154 .2101 .1893 .0791 .65 .0970 .45 .0866 .41 .0897 .47 Theft 
from car (.4444) (.6280) (.5919) (.5777) (.3694)   (.4347)   (.4026)   (.4106)   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0356 .0394 .0705 .0490 .0293 .82 .0259 .65 .0389 .55 .0309 .63 Burglary 
(.2404) (.2515) (.3569) (.2894) (.2110)   (.2032)   (.2646)   (.2269)   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0367 .0389 .0614 .0460 .0177 .48 .0129 .33 .0282 .45 .0189 .41 Attempted 
burglary (.2342) (.2523) (.3318) (.2784) (.1661)   (.1505)   (.2339)   (.1851)   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0168 .0306 .0619 .0384 .0093 .55 .0096 .31 .0164 .26 .0118 .30 Robbery 
(.1694) (.2339) (.3391) (.2687) (.1279)   (.1239)   (.1712)   (.1421)   
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0840 .0570 .0729 .0674 .0317 .37 .0144 .25 .0159 .21 .0182 .27 Assault & 
threat (.4501) (.3703) (.3991) (.3963) (.2956)   (.1940)   (.1828)   (.2140)   
Source: Author’s calculations from International Crime Victims Survey data.  All figures are weighted using the country weights calculated by the survey. The 
sample sizes depend on the crime type, varying from 140,352 to 140,487, except for car-related thefts (82,704 to 83,163) because questions on these thefts were 
only asked of car owners. 
a The proportion of respondents who experienced at least one episode of the particular type of crime in the year prior to the survey.  
b Refers to the most recent victimization episode and excludes any ‘don’t know’ responses. 
c Reporting rate. 
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Table 2: Regression Estimates of Equation (3), the Relationship Between Actual and Reported Crimes 
 Between Effects Model  Fixed Effects Model  
 
λˆ  
(S.E.) 
Test for 
Correlated Errors 
0H : 1λ =  
 
λˆ  
(S.E) 
Test for Time-
Varying Errors 
0H : 1λ =  
.9428 p =.022 .9191 p =.000 Car Theft 
(.023)  (.0009)  
.2994 p =.000 .4805 p =.000 Theft from car 
(.0567)  (.0018)  
.5437 p =.000 .6025 p =.000 Burglary 
(.0437)  (.0013)  
.4856 p =.000 .4277 p =.000 Attempted Burglary 
(.0445)  (.0013)  
.2227 p =.000 .3596 p =.000 Robbery 
(.0221)  (.0013)  
.2544 p =.000 .3407 p =.000 Assault and Threat 
(.0541)  (.0012)  
Source: Author’s calculations from International Crime Victims Survey data.  All figures are weighted using the 
country weights calculated by the survey. The sample sizes depend on the crime type, varying from 140,352 to 
140,487, except for car-related thefts (82,704 to 83,163). 
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Table 3: Determinants of Whether Victims Report Crimes to the Police 
 Car theft Theft from car Burglary Attempt Burglary Robbery Assault/threat 
Personal characteristics       
Age at time of survey‡ 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 (0.92) (4.25)** (3.61)** (4.24)** (8.06)** (8.42)** 
       
Male respondent -0.014 -0.003 -0.018 0.018 -0.010 -0.016 
 (1.42) (0.25) (1.37) (1.32) (0.66) (1.41) 
       
Years of schooling‡ 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 
 (0.36) (1.68)+ (5.40)** (2.05)* (4.86)** (2.94)** 
       
Not employed -0.021 0.004 -0.024 -0.003 -0.016 -0.004 
 (1.93)+ (0.35) (1.80)+ (0.22) (1.10) (0.35) 
Dwelling and community characteristics       
Shanty dwelling (interviewer obs) 0.023 0.038 -0.036 -0.094 -0.068 -0.037 
 (0.65) (0.52) (1.00) (2.35)* (1.70)+ (1.23) 
       
House insured  0.004 0.083 0.087 0.063 0.023 -0.004 
 (0.30) (5.54)** (4.41)** (2.95)** (0.92) (0.20) 
       
City population > 1 million 0.009 -0.032 0.007 -0.042 0.014 -0.028 
 (0.79) (2.38)* (0.41) (2.63)** (0.80) (2.04)* 
       
High status area (interviewer obs) 0.006 0.039 0.080 0.017 0.041 -0.007 
 (0.52) (2.77)** (4.42)** (0.89) (1.91)+ (0.43) 
National variables       
Gini coefficient‡ -0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.000 -0.005 0.001 
 (5.33)** (9.13)** (1.05) (0.47) (4.11)** (1.30) 
       
Income relative to U.S. (PPP)‡  0.004 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.004 
 (5.43)** (11.93)** (6.34)** (1.36) (6.94)** (5.43)** 
       
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index‡ 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.35) (2.49)* (4.50)** (1.76)+ (1.05) (1.63) 
       
Pseudo-R2 0.073 0.080 0.077 0.026 0.052 0.033 
Wald test (slopes = 0) χ2 (16 df) 107.3** 1032.7** 606.9** 177.7** 276.5** 259.2** 
Predicted probability ( XPˆ ) 0.933 0.456 0.635 0.328 0.318 0.252 
Number of observations 3062 11333 7624 6344 5258 7691 
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects from a probit model that includes fixed effects for each continent and are estimated on individually weighted data.  
Variables with a ‡ are continuous and have marginal effects calculated for infinitesimal changes, other variables have marginal effects calculated for discrete 
changes from 0 to 1. The sample is individuals victimized in the previous year, which varies with the type of crime. 
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Table 4: Effect of Inequality on Experienced and Reported Crime 
 Bivariate regressionsa Adding covariatesb Adding country fixed effectsc 
 Experienced
Crime 
1ˆβ  
Reported 
Crime 
1
ˆβλ  
Test of 
Difference 
( 0H : Δ =0)d 
Experienced
Crime 
1ˆβ  
Reported 
Crime 
1
ˆβλ  
Test of 
Difference 
( 0H : Δ =0)d 
Experienced
Crime 
1ˆβ  
Reported 
Crime 
1
ˆβλ  
Test of 
Difference 
( 0H : Δ =0)d 
.1004** .0848*  .0908* .0782+  .1635** .1185**  Car theft 
(.0352) (.0351) p =.000 (.0421) (.0406) p =.024 (.0458) (.0380) p =.037 
          
.2940** .0304  .2281 -.0261  .3342 .2533+  Theft 
from car (.1314) (.0871) p =.008 (.1517) (.1099) p =.045 (.3623) (.1318) p =.776 
          
.1667** .0721  .1153** .0637  .2042** .1005**  Burglary 
(.0592) (.0448) p =.000 (.0592) (.0670) p =.083 (.0493) (.0275) p =.002 
          
.1618** .0676*  .1246+ .0370*  .1905** .1210**  Attempted 
burglary (.0494) (.0297) p =.002 (.0692) (.0297) p =.027 (.0657) (.0755) p =.331 
          
.2507** .0582**  .2934** .0701**  .2366** .0590**  Robbery 
(.0662) (.0145) p =.001 (.0662) (.0145) p =.005 (.0760) (.0222) p =.002 
          
.1306** .0073  .2193** .0563**  .1073 .0098  Assault & 
threat (.0514) (.0159) p =.008 (.0514) (.0159) p =.002 (.0802) (.0262) p =.173 
Source: Author’s calculations from International Crime Victims Survey data for 37 countries (n=82 survey year × country observations). The experienced crime 
rate and reported crime rate are based on weighted aggregations from up to 140,000 respondents. 
a Values are regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in ( ). **=significant at 1% level, *=significant at 5% level, +=significant at 10% level. 
b The additional variables are GDP per capita relative to the U.S. (using purchasing power parity exchange rates) and the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index. 
c An additional 36 country-specific intercepts are added to the regression models. 
d Chi-squared test (df=1) for difference in coefficient values between the equations for experienced crime and reported crime, with p-values for the null hypothesis 
of no difference. 
 
 
 
